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In the last forty years there has been a resurgence of interest in moral dilemmas—situations in which through no fault of a person’s own, he or she is morally required to do one thing, required to do another, but cannot do both.  Some prominent figures have argued that such things could be.  Opponents have marshaled several anti-dilemma arguments in response. 
	For the most part, this debate has centered on issues in metaethics.  For example, consider the pro-dilemma argument given by Thomas Nagel.​[2]​  Nagel argues that there are a variety of sources of moral value—utility, justice, perfectionist ideals, and so on—none reducible to any other.  He then tries to show that because these sources of value cannot always be compared, conflicts between them may not always be resolvable, and hence dilemmas can arise.  
Nagel’s argument has spawned several further discussions in metaethics; among them, whether moral reasons are ever incommensurable, and what the upshot would be if they were.  However, it is not just the pro-dilemma arguments that turn on metaethical issues; anti-dilemma arguments do as well.  For example, one of the most often-heard anti-dilemma arguments is grounded in the principle ‘ought implies can’.  It runs as follows.  In a dilemma, a person has a requirement to do one thing, a requirement to do another, but cannot do both.  But according to what is commonly called the principle of agglomeration, if a person is required to do one thing and are required to do another, then that person is required to do both things.  However, doing both things is impossible—a result that conflicts with ‘ought implies can’, and hence shows that dilemmas are impossible.​[3]​
Again, this argument has generated further debates in metaethics.  Most dilemma advocates (though not all) are reluctant to give up on ‘ought implies can’, and therefore both sides have focused on the principle of agglomeration.  Proponents of this argument defend agglomeration; dilemma advocates reject it.
These metaethical questions are interesting, and resolving them could (in principle, at least) settle the debate about moral dilemmas.  However, this paper will show that this exclusive focus on metaethics has been a mistake.  Both dilemma advocates and dilemma opponents have failed to recognize that the debate could also be settled by answering an important question in normative ethics: is it possible for there to be an absolute prohibition on allowing something to happen?  If the answer is yes, then dilemmas are possible, and if the answer is no, then they are not.  Furthermore, it will be argued that it is our instincts about this normative issue that truly shape our views on the dilemmas debate.





Some people think dilemmas are possible; many think not.  The next three sections of this paper are intended to elucidate the moral theories that underlie both positions.  What must morality be like if it is to either exclude or accommodate dilemmas?  
This section begins with a description of what will be termed all-things-considered moral theory.  That theory excludes moral dilemmas, and adherence to it grounds some people’s intuitive resistance to moral dilemmas.  However, interesting questions about dilemmas arise once the theory is modified to accommodate absolute prohibitions on certain kinds of action, and so the sections that follow show how that modification can produce either a moral theory which continues to exclude dilemmas or a theory which accommodates dilemmas.  

One moral theory that excludes dilemmas is all-things-considered moral theory.  The view is this.  The world presents us with competing courses of action, and often there are moral reasons in favor of each.  In such a case morality demands that we compare the reasons.  The required action, if any, is the one favored by stronger reasons.​[4]​  Because two competing actions cannot both be favored by the stronger reasons, at most one among competing actions is required.  If the reasons in favor of the competing courses of action are equal, then at most we are required to do one thing or the other.
An example will make this view clearer.  Suppose we had to decide between saving a life and breaking a trivial but genuine promise.  In such a case the intuitive judgement would be that the promise is overridden by the competing moral concerns.  Why?  Because we would implicitly appeal to the tenets of all-things-considered moral theory.  There is stronger reason to save the life than to keep the promise, and so only the former can be required. 
	Now it might seem as though all-things-considered moral theory rules out moral dilemmas all on its own.  In order to see why, consider a situation in which the only way to prevent a bomb from blowing up a city is by torturing a terrorist.  Nagel, a dilemma advocate, suggests that a dilemma might arise in this case.​[5]​  However, the all-things-considered view seems to rule this out.  If the moral reasons in favor of one action are stronger than the moral reasons in favor of the other, then the first alone is morally required.  On the other hand, if the two sets of reasons are equally strong, then the all-things-considered rules tell us that we have a disjunctive requirement either to torture the terrorist and stop the bomb or to not torture him and let the bomb explode.  In neither case is there a dilemma.
As has been said, this seems to be the case—it seems as though all-things-considered moral theory rules out dilemmas.  However, things aren’t quite as simple as this.  If someone were intent upon introducing dilemmas into all-things-considered moral theory, he might argue that there is most reason to save the people and not torture the terrorist.  True, this is impossible.  But there is more reason to do this than anything else, he might say.  And so even by the rules of the all-things-considered moral theory, saving the people and not torturing the terrorist is required.  
It’s a strange idea, but it also highlights the fact that all-things-considered moral theory doesn’t rule out dilemmas entirely on its own.  Instead, all-things-considered theory must be combined with a principle like ‘ought implies can’.​[6]​  If ought implies can, then there cannot be a requirement to save the people and torture the terrorist.  That, after all, is impossible.
So all-things-considered moral theory rules out dilemmas when combined with ‘ought implies can’.  As a result, dilemma advocates must either reject ‘ought implies can’ or some aspect of all-things-considered moral theory.  And so they do, opting in almost all instances for the latter choice and not the former.​[7]​  However, it is not just dilemma advocates who reject all-things-considered moral theory.  Many dilemma opponents also find all-things-considered moral theory too simplistic, so they reject all-things-considered theory as well.  And interestingly, both sides of the debate reject all-things-considered theory for the very same reason.​[8]​   Before spelling out those two positions, then, let’s take a look at the reason for rejecting the simple all-things-considered view.

The Problem With All-Things-Considered Moral Theory

Many people reject all-things-considered moral theory because it cannot accommodate constraints.  Constraints are absolute prohibitions on action; they dictate that an action can never be performed, regardless of what is to be gained by doing it, and thus constraints cannot be part of the all-things-considered view.  Recall that the all-things-considered view tells us that in each and every case, the reasons for competing courses of action are weighed against each other, and an action is required only if it is backed by the stronger reasons.  However, constraints are not produced in this way.  For example, if there is a constraint against murder, then it is not that there is some strong reason to avoid murder that is properly compared against other moral concerns.  Instead, murder is absolutely off-limits, and one need not even consider the alternatives in order to know this.  Thus constraints are not generated in accordance with the all-things-considered rules.	
All-things-considered moral theory must therefore be modified in order to accommodate constraints—modified, not completely rejected, because believers in absolute constraints can still maintain that when a constraint is not in play, the all-things-considered rules determine which action (if any) one ought to perform.  However, they must reject the theory’s universal applicability and hold that if an action is constrained, then the all-things-considered rules do not apply: the constrained action is off-limits no matter what is to be gained by performing it. 
Once one adopts this modified version of all-things-considered moral theory—which will now be called constraint theory—it can no longer be used to ground the simple argument against dilemmas given in the last section.  In fact, the presence of constraints in a moral theory immediately raises the specter of moral dilemmas.  If constraints exist, then one naturally asks: could it turn out that someone had only two courses of action, and that in each case, the action is constrained?  If so, then the result would be a moral dilemma.​[9]​
In the next two sections it will be argued that both dilemma opponents and dilemma advocates accept some version of constraint theory, but that each side fills out the details of that theory in a slightly different way.  More specifically, it will be shown that the most common version of constraint theory contains restrictions on which sorts of actions can be constrained, thus eliminating the possibility that all available options are prohibited.  Dilemma advocates do not accept these same restrictions, thus making room for moral dilemmas.

The Moral Theory of Dilemma Opponents

The previous sections revealed that there is an intuitive but somewhat simplistic picture of morality—the all-things-considered view—that rules out moral dilemmas when combined with ‘ought implies can’.  However, it was also shown that because the position cannot accommodate absolute constraints, many would find it suspect.  Is this a great victory for dilemma advocates?  No.  As will now be argued, dilemmas cannot be generated by the sorts of absolute constraints most people normally accept.  More specifically, it will be shown that the activities that are normally thought to be absolutely prohibited all have two qualities: (1) they are things people do and not things people allow to happen, and (2) they are things people do freely.​[10]​  After that, it will be shown that if this popular conception of constrained action is correct, then one cannot be thrust into a situation where absolutely prohibited behavior is unavoidable.
	All activities normally thought to be absolute prohibited are things people do rather than allow.  This can be seen if one thinks about the standard candidates for absolutely prohibited actions: murder, torture, mutilation, and so on.  All are clearly doings.  And though some allowings might appear to be candidates as well, a closer inspection reveals they are not.  For example, it might be objected that allowing one’s children to starve seems absolutely prohibited.  In fact, this isn’t so, and this becomes clear when one thinks about a situation in which the only way to feed one’s starving children is by murdering someone and making off with their food.  In such a case, murder is still ordinarily thought to be off-limits.​[11]​
	But not only are all prohibited actions doings, they are also things people do freely.   Once again this becomes clear if one considers simple cases.  Take any constrained action (e.g., torture) and then ask whether someone who performed that action unfreely would have violated a moral prohibition.  The answer is no.  As ordinarily conceived, moral rules are binding only on those who have the ability to conform to them.  So if one acts unfreely, one’s actions violate no moral prohibitions.​[12]​
	This is our ordinary conception of absolutely prohibitions—all prohibited actions are freely performed doings.  It must now be shown that the theory just spelled out, which will be called ordinary constraint theory, cannot give rise to moral dilemmas.
Could there be a situation in which all courses of actions were absolutely prohibited, thus making the situation dilemmatic?  No, not if ordinary constraint theory is correct.  For in any situation, one option is always to do nothing.  And though that would allow certain things to happen, allowing to happen never violates a constraint.​[13]​  Doing nothing could be removed as a possibility only if an agent were being compelled to act by an outside force.  And in that case the agent would act unfreely, and hence would not violate an absolute constraint either.
Here is this reasoning applied to an example.  Take the constraint on killing the innocent.  Why is it that one cannot be thrust into a situation where the only options are killing innocent A and killing innocent B?  Because in such cases one could simply refrain from killing either.  And if refraining is impossible, it is because one is being compelled by some force—perhaps an unstoppable, insane desire.  But the unfree act isn’t governed by the absolute prohibition.  Thus, violation of this constraint cannot be unavoidable.
Now the foregoing remarks were not intended as a defense of ordinary constraint theory—the view that only freely performed doings could be constrained.  In fact, later sections of the paper will argue that there is very little that can be said in defense of that theory.  Instead the point of investigating it was to reveal that this theory (or the original all-things-considered moral theory) lies behind most people’s rejection of moral dilemmas.​[14]​  

The Moral Theory of Dilemma Advocates

Earlier it was argued that the introduction of constraints into moral theory opened up the possibility of moral dilemmas.  After all, if actions can be absolutely prohibited, one must wonder whether there could be only two courses of action, both of which were constrained.  The previous section gave the dilemma opponent’s view: because all constrained actions are freely performed doings, the existence of constraints will not produce dilemmas.  In light of this, dilemma advocates must reject either the idea that only free actions can be constrained or that only doings can be constrained.  And because rejecting the former seems difficult at best, dilemma advocates must endorse a version of constraint theory that countenances constrained allowings.  
When dilemma advocates accept the possibility of constrained allowings, they escape from the anti-dilemma argument that grows out of ordinary constraint theory.  Moreover, that same moral theory shows us how there could actually be moral dilemmas.  If there can be constrained allowings, then it should be possible to come up with a situation where all available actions, including doing nothing, are absolutely prohibited—a moral dilemma.  A version of constraint theory that countenances constrained allowings is therefore a dilemma theory.  
	This sort of dilemma theory was implicit in one of the earlier examples.  Recall the case in which torturing a terrorist is the only means to diffusing a bomb.  If a dilemma does arises in that case, it is because all options, including allowings, are constrained.  Why?  Because if one believed that there is an absolute constraint against torture but not against allowing people to die, then the answer would be straightforward: it is impermissible to torture the terrorist.  If there were no absolute constraint—if there were only strong but overridable reasons to perform each of the two actions—then the result of balancing the reasons against each other would yield, at most, a requirement to do one or the other.  A dilemma would only arise if there were a constraint against allowing people to die.  That constraint would then conflict with the constraint against torture, and a dilemma would result.

Can There Be Constrained Allowings?

So far two sorts of constraint theories have been spelled out: ordinary constraint theory and dilemma theory.  Furthermore, readers who accept constraints will probably have recognized that their instincts about dilemmas—either for or against—do not result from somewhat abstruse metaethical commitments, but rather from commitments to one of these substantive ethical theories.  Now it must be asked whether there is any reason to believe that one of these views is superior to the other—that is, whether there is any good reason to think that there can or can’t be constraints on allowings.  In the final section of this paper it will be argued that such reasons are harder to produce than is perhaps normally imagined, and thus that those with anti-dilemma intuitions should view those instincts with some suspicion.

Could there be constraints on allowings?  It’s worth noting that the idea that there could be, though perhaps unintuitive, is far from absurd once it is given serious consideration.  Everyone must admit that there are some specific occasions when allowing something to happen is morally forbidden, and hence nothing in the nature of an allowing prevents such things from being impermissible.  So why couldn’t some allowings be absolutely impermissible—prohibited, not just in some circumstances, but in all?  Some might reject constraints altogether, and assessing the merits of that rejection would move this paper too far afield.  But for those who do accept constraints, it seems as that as far as ordinary moral thought is concerned, constraints on allowings are a live possibility.​[15]​  
However, there is an objection that dilemma opponents often offer when presented with a purported case of a constrained allowing.  Take Bernard Williams’s example of Agamemnon.  In that case, Agamemnon faces the choice between fulfilling his paternal duties or allowing harm to come to great numbers of his troops, and Williams contends that Agamemnon is in a true moral dilemma.  Dilemma opponents begin their objection to such cases by highlighting the fact that the dilemma advocates do not merely claim that there is a constraint against (say) allowing harm.  Instead, dilemma advocates claim that there is a constraint on allowing harm to come to large numbers, and this is where the objection to constrained allowings takes hold.  Dilemma opponents allege it is incoherent to suppose that there are constraints against allowing large numbers to die.  Why?  Because constraints don’t arise when a certain amount of moral value is at stake.  Instead, it is something about the nature of the act that is forbidden.  Thus, the dilemma advocates’ examples—examples in which actions are prohibited because of the amount of moral value at stake—simply cannot be examples of constraints.  
This reasoning can be fleshed out further.  The crucial claim is that constraints can’t be based on the amount of moral value at stake, but must instead arise because of the nature of the constrained action.  This view is highly plausible.  For example, murder is not forbidden because it has a certain (very high) disvalue.  If it were, then one could commit murder to prevent an even greater number of murders.  But consequentialist murder-minimization is also forbidden by a constraint, and so the constraint is not grounded in the amount of moral value at stake.  More generally, dilemma opponents can rightly claim that if a constraint arises because of the amount of moral value at stake, then the constraint isn’t absolute.  
With this point in hand, dilemma opponents need only draw out its powerful consequences in order to raise grave difficulties for dilemma advocates.  If, as dilemma advocates allege, there is an absolute constraint against allowing one million (or whatever number) to die, then this constraint cannot be based on the amount of moral value at stake.  And yet it obviously is.  Allowing one million to die seems no different in nature from allowing nine-hundred thousand to die—at least not in any way that could ground a constraint only on the former.  Instead, the obvious difference is in the amount of moral value at stake.  Consequently, there cannot be an absolute constraint against allowing one million to die.​[16]​
How effective is this objection?  There is something right in it—it shows that the particular examples given by dilemma theorists are often not the best.  However, despite its apparent strength, the objection just given is, in the end, a failure.  There are better examples that the dilemma theorists can choose, examples that are immune to the problems just discussed.
The dilemma opponents have rightly shown that by trying to combine what cannot be combined—quantity of moral value and absolute constraints—dilemma advocates end up with an incoherent position.  But what, exactly, has been proven incoherent?  Recall that the objection focused on the actual examples given by dilemma advocates.  In those examples, a great amount of moral value is at stake, and because it would be a terrible thing if that moral value were lost, an absolute constraint is (allegedly) generated.  Dilemma opponents undercut this position by showing that absolute constraints cannot be grounded in the amount of moral value at stake.
However, this focus on specific examples dooms the objection.  The objection rules out constraints on certain allowings—allowings of the sort often discussed by dilemma advocates.  However, the objection cannot be extended to rule out all constrained allowings.  Why not?  Suppose that dilemma advocates claimed there was an absolute constraint against allowing anyone to die.  That constraint wouldn’t need to be grounded in the amount of moral value at stake.  Instead, dilemma advocates could claim that the very nature of the action generates the constraint—just as the very nature of murder generates a constraint against it.  And if so, there is no incoherence.  The dilemma advocates have not tried to combine amount of moral value and absolute constraints, and so their position isn’t touched by the objection from the previous section.  




This paper has two principal conclusions.  First, it has been shown that the debate about moral dilemmas is intimately connected with an issue in normative ethics—the issue of whether there can be constraints on allowings.  Second, it has been argued that this issue has not yet been resolved because constrained allowings, while perhaps unintuitive to some, are not easy to rule out.  
These facts point toward an interesting possibility for dilemma advocates.  Here only a single objection to constrained allowings has been considered and overcome.  If more such objections could be overcome, including most of the obvious ones, then dilemma theorists might offer up the following argument for agnosticism about moral dilemmas:  Constrained allowings seem like a live possibility, and since that possibility is very difficult to rule out, anti-dilemma intuitions should be viewed with more than a bit of scepticism.  Instead, they should be abandoned altogether and we should become agnostic about the existence of moral dilemmas. 
If such an argument could be developed, it would differ from other pro-dilemma arguments in two important ways.  Many arguments for dilemmas make use either of actual examples or of examples very similar to actual situations.  Thus, those arguments help establish that there really are (or are likely to be) moral dilemmas.  The argument sketched here would be different.  No examples would be used, and instead of establishing the real possibility of dilemmas, it would merely show that it is epistemically possible that dilemmas exist.  Perhaps some might feel that these differences would make the proposed argument less interesting than other pro-dilemma arguments.  However, there are two reasons for thinking that those differences would be virtues.  
	First, the dilemma advocates’ examples have always been the weakest part of their case, and much of the resistance to dilemmas has resulted from the fact that pro-dilemma arguments have been partly grounded in those examples.​[18]​  In contrast, the argument proposed here would demonstrate that one ought to remain agnostic about the possibility of moral dilemmas, but would do so without appealing to controversial examples.  And better still, one step in that argument would be to show that there is no principled reason for our anti-dilemma intuitions.  Thus, not only would that argument not rest on controversial examples, but it would fend off the objection that dilemmas ought to be rejected on the grounds that they are unintuitive.   
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^9	  Most dilemma advocates seem to be aware that they must reject all-things-considered moral theory and that if they do so by introducing constraints, they open up room for moral dilemmas.  These facts reveal themselves in the examples dilemma advocates choose.  For instance, consider the case that revived the dilemmas debate: Bernard Williams’s Agamemnon example.  In that example, Agamemnon must choose between sacrificing his daughter and obtaining victory for his army.  Clearly in that situation, it is not just the demands of utility which generate a conflict, but the demands of justice as well.  Other examples of dilemmas are usually of this same general sort.  (For Williams’s discussion of the Agamemnon example, see “Ethical Consistency,” reprinted in his Problems of the Self [London: Cambridge University Press, 1973], pp. 166-186.)
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^12	  Here the argument glosses over the fact that unfreedom wouldn’t be an excuse if one willingly brought it on. 
^13	  Of course, there are times when one is required not to allow certain things to happen.  The point here is that such requirements are not the result of an absolute constraint—a constraint of the sort that there is on, say, murder.
^14	  There is another way in which dilemma opponents might argue that absolute constraints cannot give rise to moral dilemmas.  They might claim that, while there are constraints on both doings and allowings, these constraints are prioritized by a higher-order principle.  If two constraints come into conflict, the priority principle tells us which of the two constraints truly constrains our action (and which can be permissibly ignored).  	Perhaps if constraints were prioritized it would seem less plausible that they were absolute.  However, the name might still be deserved.  It would still be the case that there is a constraint against doing (or allowing) X in order to bring about what there is great reason to do.  Murder of a scapegoat is not allowable, even if it would please the bloodthirsty masses.  Likewise, allowing the slaughter of a million is not allowable, even if that too would please the masses.  There is a constraint against both actions—so long as they are not pitted against each other.  	Perhaps, then, dilemma opponents could admit that there are constraints on both doings and allowings, but reject dilemmas on the grounds that constraints are prioritized.  This discussion won’t be followed further, because doing so would lead into one of the dilemmas debate’s many thickets: incommensurability.  Why?  Briefly, a dilemma advocate might respond to this prioritization claim by arguing that constraints arise from many different sources of value (e.g., justice, utility, perfectionist ideals), and that these sources are incommensurable.  Thus a constraint of justice such as ‘do not murder’ cannot be compared or prioritized with respect to a constraint of utility like ‘don’t allow one million people to die’.  	A few more remarks about incommensurability are made later on.  The subject comes up in many different places in the dilemmas debate, and the dilemma advocates’ most useful appeals to incommensurability seem to be those made in response to prioritization claims.  
^15	  Put another way:  Opponents of dilemmas have often thought of dilemma theory as a radically different moral view, and thus they concluded its possibility was remote.  However, this opinion rests on a misunderstanding.  As was seen earlier, dilemma advocates are not the extremists they are often made out to be.  It’s not that most people have one kind of ethical theory and the dilemma advocates have another.  Instead, the dilemma advocates merely amend the all-things-considered view by acknowledging that when constraints are at play, the all-things-considered rules do not apply—something many of us admit as well.  All that is new in dilemma theory is the kind of actions that can be absolutely constrained.
^16	  Sometimes the point is put this way: if there were a constraint against allowing one million to die, then what is to be said when one must either allow one million to die or allow one million million to die?  Dilemma advocates are committed to the bizarre view that this situation is dilemmatic.  	Dilemma advocates could say that anyone who gives this objection has failed to grasp the fact that there is a constraint against allowing people to die.  Numbers are not relevant to constraints, and so it is no surprise that the case of one million versus one million million is genuinely dilemmatic.  The situation can be compared to one in which a person must either murder one or murder three.  (An example:  A murderer pushes a boulder down a hill.  If he does nothing to stop it, then the boulder will crush three people.  This murder of three can only be stopped if he pushes one person in front of the rolling boulder.  Thus, he must murder one or murder three.)  In such a case, it is not tempting to think that the prohibition on murdering three makes the murder of the one any more acceptable.  The reason is that there is clearly an absolute constraint against murder.  Dilemma advocates can say that, similarly, if one truly understood that there was a constraint against allowing one million to die, one would also realize the dilemmatic nature of the one-million-versus-one-million-million situation.	However, this response won’t satisfy; instead it merely highlights the real difficulty with the dilemma theorists’ position: that in all of their examples, a constraint against allowing to die is generated when some high number of lives is at stake.  
^17	  A dilemma opponent might object to my claim that “the most natural objection to constrained allowings has failed” on the following grounds:If there were constraints on some actions, at least some of those constraints would be placed on doings.  If, in addition to constraints on doings, there were also constraints on allowings, then dilemmas could arise.  Consequently, every argument against dilemmas is ipso facto an argument against constrained allowings.  The standard arguments against dilemmas are quite strong.Hence we have good reasons to believe there are no constrained allowings.The two initial assumptions of the objection seem secure—the first is highly plausible, and the second is one of the points made in this paper, and hence fair game.  In light of this, the only alternative seems to be to challenge the remaining premise: that the standard arguments against dilemmas are strong.  There are at least two ways to do so.First, one could embrace one of the many objections that have been given to the standard arguments against dilemmas.  For a survey of them, see the introduction to Gowan’s Moral Dilemmas, Ibid.  Second, one could argue that the standard arguments against dilemmas should be questioned precisely because they entail that there can be no constrained allowings.  The strategy would be this.  As the objector points out, the standard arguments against dilemmas (when combined with other plausible assumptions) entail that there can be no constrained allowings.  However, they do so without telling us why there cannot be constrained allowings.  Now in some cases this that/why distinction would be of no interest.  For example, if there were no other information about the existence of constrained allowings, then these anti-dilemma arguments would provide good reason for rejecting the possibility of constrained allowings.  But suppose one has searched for an explanation for why there can be no constrained allowings, but has found no good answer.  If so, how should one regard (purported) proofs that there are no constrained allowings?The question probes one’s philosophical temperament, and perhaps there is no single answer to it.  But one possibility is this.  Suppose one has searched for explanations for why a claim is false, but has found none.  If so, then even when faced with a logical proof that the claim is false, one ought to be suspicious of the proof and at least remain agnostic about the whole matter.
^18	  One amusing example of this reaction:  Alan Donagan once wrote that he was bewildered when dilemma advocacy became more prevalent because “the examples of dilemmas…arose only in moral codes I considered barbarous or barbarously interpreted.”  (“Moral Dilemmas, Genuine and Spurious: A Comparative Anatomy,” printed in Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, H. E. Mason, ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1996], p. 18.)
